To strengthen the anonymity of Bitcoin, several centralized coin-mixing providers (mixers) such as BitcoinFog.com, BitLaundry.com, and Blockchain.info assist users to mix Bitcoins through CoinJoin transactions with multiple inputs and multiple outputs to uncover the relationship between them. However, these mixers know the output address of each user, such that they cannot provide true anonymity. This paper proposes a centralized coin-mixing algorithm based on an elliptic curve blind signature scheme (denoted as Blind-Mixing) that obstructs mixers from linking an input address with an output address. Comparisons among three blind signature based algorithms, Blind-Mixing, BlindCoin, and RSA Coin-Mixing, are conducted. It is determined that BlindCoin may be deanonymized because of its use of a public log. In RSA Coin-Mixing, a user's Bitcoins may be falsely claimed by another. In addition, the blind signature scheme of Blind-Mixing executes 10.5 times faster than that of RSA Coin-Mixing.
Introduction
Bitcoin is a decentralized crypto-currency that was introduced by Nakamoto [1] in 2008, and was deployed in January 2009. Bitcoin has several characteristics including peer-to-peer protocols, decentralized production of Bitcoins by the proof of work (PoW) protocol, the prevention of double spending by transparent transactions, pseudo-anonymity, and personal privacy protection, which have made Bitcoin increasingly popular. Its market value reached at peak of $12 billion in 2013.
possibility of currency loss. The last direction regards novel coin-mixing technologies such as Zerocoin [8] , Zerocash [9] , Pinocchio [10] , and CryptoNote [11] , which are not compatible with the Bitcoin Protocol, and must be applied in new blockchains.
This paper discusses centralized coin-mixing for Bitcoin, where a serious weakness of centralized coin-mixing is that coin-mixing providers (mixers) must know a user's input address and output address so that Bitcoins can be mixed correctly and currency can be correctly output to a user's output address. Hence, centralized coin-mixing cannot provide true anonymity for users.
A blind digital signature represents a condition where a signer signs the digest of a message while the content of the message is unknown to the signer. In 1982, David Chaum [12] first proposed to implement an anonymous e-Cash system based on the use of blind signatures, which was intended to protect the anonymity of a sender unconditionally. In 1993, Okamoto [13] proposed the first blind signature scheme based on the discrete logarithm. In 2012, Watson Ladd [14] proposed making Bitcoin transactions untraceable using blind signature. In 2015, BlindCoin [15] was proposed based on bilinear groups to make centralized coin-mixing more anonymous. In July 2015, Wu [16] also proposed a blind coin-mixing algorithm based on RSA (RSA Coin-Mixing). The present study intends to avoid several weaknesses associated with BlindCoin and RSA Coin-Mixing, and proposes a practical coin-mixing algorithm that supports more complete anonymization.
Background

Transactions and the transaction chain
A Bitcoin address is an account on the Bitcoin network, which corresponds to a bank account in conventional currency systems. A Bitcoin address is generated by double hashing a public key. Only the user who owns the corresponding private key can make use of Bitcoins lodged at this address.
of the previous transaction. All inputs should not be used within all existing transactions because this will prevent the successful verification of the transaction. Signatures aim to prove that an input amount belongs to the sender because only the private key owner can sign the transaction properly. 
Elliptic curve cryptography system used by Bitcoin
Bitcoin adopts the ECC system as its signature algorithm, and its elliptic curve is secp256k1 [17], whose formation is 2 3 (mod )
This curve can be described as T = (p, a, b, G, n, h), where a and b are constants, p is the p value of the finite field F(p) of secp256k1, G is the base point, n is the order of G, and h is a cofactor. Their values are listed as follows: The public key and private key generating process can be outlined as follows.
(1) Select a large integer d < p, and d ∈ F(p);
(2) Calculate P = dG; (3) Obtain the key pair (P, d), where P is the public key and d is the private key.
The blind signature scheme of ECC
In the general signature scheme illustrated in Fig. 2(a) , the signer produces a digital signature on known message content. Compared to the general signature scheme, the process of blind signature [12] is as illustrated in Fig. 2(b) . The requester performs a blinding shift on the message, and sends the blinded message to the signer. The signer signs the blinded message and returns the blind signature to the requester, and then the requester unblinds the blind signature to obtain the signature on the original message. The blind signature scheme of ECC adopts the same secp256k1 elliptic curve as Bitcoin. Suppose that the key pair of the signer is (P, d), the message is m, and all else is as has been defined. The blind signature algorithm from Zhang [19] is as follows.
(1) The signer randomly selects an integer k ∈ Z n * , calculates R = kG, and then transmits R to the requester.
(2) The requester randomly selects two integers γ and δ ∈ Z n * , blinds the message, and then calculates point A = kG + γG + δP = (x, y), t = x (mod n). If t equals zero, then γ and δ should be reselected. The requester calculates c = SHA256 (m || t), c' = c − δ, where SHA256 is a novel hash function computed with 32-bit words and c' is the blinded message, and then sends c' to the signer. 
where R x (cP + sG) represents obtaining the x resolution values of point cP + sG, and·||·represents the concatenation of two strings.
A blind signature algorithm has also been developed based on RSA. ECC demands a key size of 160 bits for security that is equivalent to that obtained by a 1024-bit RSA key size [19] . A shorter key size requires less storage space and reduced computation. Therefore, we choose ECC as the cryptography algorithm of Blind-Mixing. In addition, for user convenience, Blind-Mixing also makes use of the Part
Blind concept proposed by Abe [20] , where some information confirmed in advance, such as amount, validity period, and output address, are inserted into the message waiting to be signed.
Blind-Mixing
Application scheme
We construct an application scheme as follows. Suppose that there exists a Bitcoin bank, and a user deposits Bitcoins in the bank, withdraws Bitcoins from the bank, and transfers Bitcoins to businesses via the bank. Businesses can obtain payment from the bank after the bank verifies the withdrawal voucher.
The scheme is illustrated in Fig. 3 . The detailed operations that can be performed by the user are given as follows.
(1) Deposit: the user sends Bitcoins to the deposit address obtained from the bank, and generates a deposit voucher to certify the deposit. The bank verifies the deposit voucher and performs blind signature. The user receives and unblinds the blind signature and obtains the true signature. We denote the signature plus the original message as the withdrawal voucher.
(2) Payment: the user can transfer the withdrawal voucher to a business, and the business obtains the verified result from the bank and accepts the withdrawal voucher.
(3) Verification: the user requests verification of the withdrawal voucher and the bank returns the verification result.
(4) Withdrawal: the user requests a withdrawal from the bank through the withdrawal voucher, and the bank sends Bitcoins to the output address of the user after verification.
Attacker Models
Several attacker models affecting the anonymity of Blind-Mixing can be described as follows.
Passive attacker model: the attacker passively analyses the output of Bitcoins through the transaction chain of the Bitcoin system.
Active attacker model: in addition to capabilities of the passive attacker, the active attacker also obeys the Blind-Mixing protocol and engages in the coin-mixing process as a normal user. Furthermore, the attacker is able to cheat the Blind-Mixing protocol but not damage the protocol.
Super attacker model: in addition to capabilities of the active attacker, the super attacker can sniff all communication data between the user and the bank, and also controls the bank. However, the attacker aims at deanonymizing users rather than interrupting the normal process of coin-mixing.
Blind-Mixing
Blind-Mixing runs on the TOR [21] anonymity network to encrypt communication data between the user and the bank, and to hide the real IP addresses employed by the users and banks, avoiding sniffer attacks. The protocol can also simultaneously prevent banks from linking input and output addresses through a user's real IP address.
Step 1. System initialization (1) The bank generates a key pair (P, d), makes the public key public, and retains the private key.
(2) Define a series of allowable denominations v i = {v 1 , v 2 , …v n }, i = 1, 2, … n, that users must employ when performing coin-mixing.
(3) Define the message to be signed m = {O || v i || P || nonce}, where O represents the output address, v i is the withdrawal amount, P refers to the public key of the bank, which is used to identify different banks, and nonce is a random integer used for generating different messages.
(4) Define the required number of acknowledgements, where, after the deposit transaction (DT)
obtains the specific number of acknowledgements in the Bitcoin system, the bank will perform the blind signature.
(5) Define the withdrawal delay, which represents the length of time required for the user to withdraw Bitcoins after completing a DT, which is normally 1 to 3 days, to ensure that Bitcoins are adequately mixed.
(6) The withdrawal address represents the source address of the withdrawal transaction. The bank generates a series of withdrawal addresses, and sends a certain amount Bitcoins to them when preparing for the withdrawal requested by the user.
Step 2 The user sends Bitcoins to the deposit address, which is denoted as a deposit, and records the transaction ID tx_id, the entire transaction of which is denoted as a deposit transaction (DT). The user's input address is assigned as the input address of the DT, where the corresponding key pair is (Q, f). The user must ensure that a sufficient amount of Bitcoins has been lodged at the input address in advance, which is verified by the bank.
Step 3. User blinds the message
For m = {O || v i || P || nonce}, the user selects two integers γ and δ ∈ Z n * , and calculates:
The above process is denoted as blinding. After blinding, the user sends the deposit voucher [c', v i , tx_id, sign f (c' || v i || tx_id)] to the bank. This signature verifies the DT with tx_id to be sent by the user.
Step 4. Bank performs the blind signature.
The bank receives the depositing voucher and makes the following verification: ① whether or not the DT with tx_id has been used previously; ② whether or not the DT has acquired sufficient acknowledgements through the Bitcoin network. If these two verification steps are not passed, then the bank returns an error.
The bank collects the user's public key and the amount from the DT, and then checks the correctness of the signature and whether or not the amount is sufficient. If the signature is not correct, the bank returns an error. If the amount is not sufficient, the bank sends the Bitcoins back to the user's input address. The bank calculates s' = k − c'd, sends s' to the user, and saves c', v i , and tx_id.
Step 5. User unblinds the blind signature. However, if U 1 also sends 0.1 BTC, then the opposite is the case. Transaction denominations affect the anonymity of coin-mixing. Suppose that the number of coin-mixing events is M and the number of denominations is N, then the average number of coin-mixing events of a certain denomination is M/N, and the probability of finding a particular user's output address is N/M. For only a single denomination, the probability of deanonymizing is 1/M, and, if M = N, then the probability will be 1, that is, the user's output address must be discovered. It is therefore best when N = 1.
Unlinkablity
: the bank receives the deposit voucher before it is signed and obtains the withdrawal voucher after verification and withdrawal. There is only one commonality between the deposit voucher and the withdrawal voucher, which is the amount. However, the bank cannot successfully deanonymize based solely on the amount, and it must deduce the blind signature from the original message and the signature to link the signature and the blind signature. Nevertheless, to do so, the bank must know the two integers γ and δ, when, in fact, the bank knows nothing about them. If t ≠ t 2 , there are two points of A, which contradicts known conditions. Therefore, t ≡ t 2 , (c, s) = (c, s 2 ), and d = d 2 .
Deposit voucher:
ECC with elliptic curve secp256k1 is adopted in Blind-Mixing, so the key pair in the Bitcoin system is compatible with that of Blind-Mixing. Therefore, while the user requests the bank to perform blind signature, the user must send the deposit voucher and the signature on it to the bank, where the private key f is from the input address in the transaction tx_id. The bank also obtains the public key Q from this input address, and then verifies the signature and the deposit voucher using the ECC signature algorithm. If the signature is correct, then the Bitcoins lodged at the input address belong to the user.
Analysis of attacks:
anonymity of a subject means that the subject is not identifiable within a set of subjects, denoted as the anonymity set [22] . As for Blind-Mixing, the subject refers to a coin-mixing action of users. A passive attacker deanonymizes through analysis of the transaction chain. Suppose that an ordinary user U 2 joins Blind-Mixing, the mixing fee rate is fee, and the passive attacker knows the user's input address and wants to deduce the output address. As shown in Fig. 4 , the passive attacker obtains information regarding three transactions from the Bitcoin blockchain: ① the DT of U 2 ; ② the PT from the deposit address of U 2 to the withdrawal address of user U m ; and ③ the WT of U m . As such, the attacker deduces the deposit address of U 2 , and the withdrawal address and the output address of U m ;
however, the passive attacker cannot locate the withdrawal address of U 2 .
The passive attacker also narrows the anonymity set through information regarding the Bitcoin amount and the timing sequence. Suppose the WT is located in a particular block within the ω blocks after the DT, In addition to the activities of a passive attacker, an active attacker takes part in Blind-Mixing activities.
Given that U 2 is the active attacker and obviously knows his own input and output addresses, U 2 also obtains information regarding another three transactions in addition to the three transactions known by the passive attacker: ④ the DT of user U 1 ; ⑤ the PT from the deposit address of U 1 to the withdrawal address of U 2 ; ⑥ the WT of U 2 . Therefore, as shown in 
However, even if the attacker has the ability to cheat the bank, the active attacker still cannot link R i with T j .
The super attacker has some special abilities, which can be described as follows.
(1) Sniffing communication data. Blind-Mixing runs over TOR, so the super attacker cannot decode the TOR data.
(2) Control of the bank. The attacker can obtain no more information than that given by (F4).
Because of the blind signature, the super attacker cannot link the input and output address of all users.
(3) Link DTs to WTs through the two IP addresses employed by the user when depositing and withdrawing. However, Blind-Mixing runs over TOR, and the IP address is always different.
As such, deanonymization based on IP addresses is very difficult.
Clearly, Blind-Mixing resists the above attacker models.
Experiments and Analysis
We performed two experiments. The first experiment compares the performance of RSA and ECC, and the second involves a coin-mixing experiment of the Blind-Mixing system. We also compared BlindMixing with two other coin-mixing schemes based on blind signature, BlindCoin, and RSA Coin-Mixing.
Comparison of Performance
We implemented the ECC blind signature algorithm [18] with a 256-bit key size and the RSA blind signature algorithm with a 1024-bit key size [16] under Windows 8 running on a notebook with Core i7-5500U @ 2.40 GHz CPU and 16 G memory, and divided the overall process into 5 phases, which are initiation, blinding, blind signing, unblinding, and verification, to compare the performances of two algorithms in each phase. Each algorithm was run 10,000 times while collecting relevant data, which was repeated 10 times to obtain average values. The results are shown in Fig. 5 . The computation time of the initiation phase of RSA to generate 10,000 RSA public keys is quite large; however, the ECC algorithm employs a random large integer as the private key, so the speed of the initiation phase is 40 times greater than that of RSA. The performances of ECC for blind signing and 13 unblinding are more efficient than those of RSA; however, the performances of blinding and verification require more computation time than those of RSA. In total, the ECC algorithm executes 10.5 times faster than RSA. The entire of RSA blind algorithm process required 0.05 s to execute, whereas the entire ECC process required only 0.00476 s.
Coin-mixing experiment of the Blind-Mixing system
We implemented a Blind-Mixing system based on the Blind-Mixing scheme. The experiment included two roles, which are the client and the bank. The client actions are requesting a public key, depositing, blind signing, verification, and withdrawal, and the bank returns the public key of the deposit address, blind signature, verification result, and withdrawal result, and also sends withdrawal transactions.
We performed Blind-Mixing on the Blind-Mixing system 10 times using a mixing amount of 0.001 BTC, and the bank charges 0.0001 BTC as a mixing fee. The client and the bank were run under Windows 7 on the same local network. The procedure is as follows.
(1) The client generates 10 input addresses and 10 output addresses, and 0.0011 BTC is sent to each input address (see the transaction in the blockchain website:
https://blockchain.info/tx/571063021a60c785452408238f36f2916b4477049209dc33238c80f539c4 51c8). 14 The transactions of the experiment on the Blind-Mixing system are shown on Fig. 6 , and it is apparent that the transactions of the Blind-Mixing algorithm have fully completed, which verifies the feasibility of Blind-Mixing. 
Analysis and Comparisons
Comparisons between Blind-Mixing, BlindCoin and RSA Coin-Mixing algorithms are listed in Table  1 .
According to the public key cryptography algorithm, Blind-Mixing adopts ECC with a short key size and high performance, BlindCoin adopts double linear groups, and RSA Coin-Mixing adopts RSA with a long key size and low performance.
A user's deposit address and withdrawal address are unique for Blind-Mixing; thus, the deposit address and withdrawal address of another user are not discoverable. The deposit address of BlindCoin is also unique; however, RSA Coin-Mixing adopts a single public address of the bank, so attackers can easily obtain the input addresses and output addresses of all users.
The deposit voucher in Blind-Mixing requires a signature and a unique deposit address, and BlindCoin requires the deposit address only; however, in RSA Coin-Mixing, a user's Bitcoins may be falsely claimed by another person. Because transaction IDs are easily obtained by checking the public address of the bank, an active attacker can send a request for blind signature before the user does. BlindCoin publishes user information in a public log, and thus supports third-party verification and accountability; however, this weakens the anonymity of BlindCoin, and an active attacker may conduct the following actions.
(1) Join the normal process of coin-mixing, obtain the block difference α between a DT and the time when the blind signature information is published, and obtain the block difference β between a WT and the time when the signature information is published.
(2) When the bank receives the Bitcoins from a user deposit, it publishes the blind signature information on the public log, and exposes the DT, which typically occurs α blocks prior to the publishing time with an input amount of v.
(3) When the user makes a withdrawal and publishes signature information on the public log, the DT typically occurs β blocks after the publishing time with an input amount of v.
(4) By combining knowledge of α, β, and v, there is a high possibility of deducing the DT and the WT, and then obtaining the input and output addresses.
Therefore, BlindCoin and RSA Coin-Mixing cannot resist active attackers; however, Blind-Mixing can resist even super attackers. In addition, the Blind-Mixing system has already been implemented and has performed well in experiments, but the BlindCoin scheme remains theoretical.
Conclusions
This paper proposed a centralized coin-mixing algorithm denoted as Blind-Mixing based on the elliptic curve blind signature scheme, which avoids conditions where mixers can obtain the input and output addresses of users. Thus, the proposed scheme improves the anonymity of centralized coin-mixing.
The paper also considered three types of attacker models and their effects on Blind-Mixing.
The results of the analysis showed that Blind-Mixing can resist even super attackers. In addition,
BlindCoin may be deanonymized successfully with high possibility because of its use of a public log.
Moreover, in RSA Coin-Mixing, a user's Bitcoins may be falsely claimed by another, and other users' deposit and withdrawal transactions are easily exposed. Therefore, the comparisons conducted show that
Blind-Mixing provides for better anonymity than BlindCoin and RSA Coin-Mixing.
This paper also compared the performances of the RSA and ECC blind signature algorithms, and the results showed that the ECC blind signature scheme provides an overall computational speed that is 10.5
times greater than that of the of RSA blind signature scheme. We implemented a Blind-Mixing system based on the Blind-Mixing scheme, and testing verified that the Blind-Mixing system is feasible for practical applications.
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